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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (2009). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
It appears that Plaintiff/Appellant Joel Evans ("Mr. Evans") asserts two issues on 
appeal against Third-Party Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation ("the City"): 
1. Does the Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Act ("PELTDA") preclude 
the City from reducing Mr. Evans' disability payments by the amount of his Veterans 
disability payments? 
2. May the City sue Mr. Evans for repayment on a contract obligation while also 
asserting Mr. Evans' counterclaims on the same contract must be arbitrated? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Evans was a police officer for the City. In October 2001, Mr. Evans applied 
for disability benefits pursuant to the City's Long-Term Disability Plan ("the LTD Plan" 
or "the Plan"), which was administered by Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant/Appellee 
Educators Mutual Insurance Company ("Educators"). 
Educators determined that Mr. Evans was entitled to the following benefits under 
the LTD Plan: 2/3 of his salary for 24 months, offset by social security and armed 
services (UVA") disability benefits received by Mr. Evans during that time period. Mr. 
Evans disagreed with Educators' determinations, but failed to comply with the claims 
review process outlined in the LTD Plan. 
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Despite repeated requests from Educators, Mr. Evans failed to disclose the amount 
of his VA disability benefits while receiving benefits from Educators under the LTD 
Plan. As a result, Educators overpaid Mr. Evans in the amount of $8,510.78. 
In November 2004, Educators filed a Complaint against Mr. Evans seeking 
recovery of the overpayment. Mr. Evans filed an Answer to Educators' Complaint, along 
with a Counterclaim against Educators and a Third-Party Complaint against the City. 
Mr. Evans' claims against the City and Educators asserted that they breached the terms of 
the LTD Plan and Utah statutes by refusing to pay him 100% of his salary, that he was 
entitled to full benefits under the LTD Plan without offset of VA benefits he received, he 
was entitled to LTD Plan benefits for longer than 24 months, and the City failed to 
inform Mr. Evans of his COBRA benefits. 
On January 17, 2006, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support. The City asserted that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
("UGIA") barred all of Mr. Evans' non-contractual claims, i.e. COBRA, statutory 
compliance and LTD Plan administration. It also asserted that Evans failed to comply 
with the terms of the LTD Plan, i.e. he failed to exhaust the claims review process, as 
required under the Plan, before resorting to arbitration or litigation. Mr. Evans had no 
right under the LTD Plan to sue the City at all, as he did here, since the Plan's terms were 
clear that arbitration was both mandatory and the exclusive method of resolving claims 
and disputes. 
Mr. Evans opposed the City's motion, alleging for the first time that the arbitration 
provisions in the LTD Plan were unenforceable and failed to comply with various 
provisions of the Utah Administrative Code. Evans also asserted, for the first time in this 
litigation, that the City was barred from ''seeking arbitration" due to its ^participation in 
litigation." Evans argued that because Educators brought an action against him to 
recover an overpayment and Evans then sued the City through a third-party complaint, 
the City waived any right to arbitration. Nowhere in his opposing memorandum did 
Evans argue or assert that he complied with, or exhausted, the claims review process as 
required under the LTD Plan. Indeed, he admitted he did not comply with or exhaust the 
claims review process. 
On November 27, 2006, the trial court granted the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The court ruled that the UGIA does not apply to Mr. Evans' contractual 
claims, but barred his other claims that do not sound in contract due to his failure to file a 
notice of claim. The court also ruled that the arbitration provisions of the LTD Plan were 
consistent with and enforceable under the relevant Utah law and administrative rules. 
Further litigation ensued between Mr. Evans and Educators which did not involve 
the City. The trial court granted Educators' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on 
May 20, 2009, and Mr. Evans filed his Notice of Appeal on June 19, 2009. 
RESPONSE TO MR, EVANS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City responds to the specific paragraphs of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts that 
address the City as follows: 
Paragraph 46: On January 17, 2006, the City filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Evans. The City argued that Evans did not request arbitration as 
required by the Plan's terms. Record p. 490-514. 
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RESPONSE: This Statement of Fact is only partially correct. The City moved for 
summary judgment on essentially two grounds. First, the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act barred all of Mr. Evans' non-contractual claims, i.e. COBRA, statutory compliance 
and LTD Plan administration. Second, Evans failed to comply with the terms of the LTD 
Plan, i.e. he failed to exhaust the claims review process, as required under the Plan, 
before resorting to arbitration or litigation (R. 963). The City did not argue that Evans 
failed to request arbitration. The City also asserted that Evans had no right under the 
LTD Plan to sue the City, since the Plan's terms were clear that arbitration was 
mandatory and the exclusive method of resolving claims, controversies or disputes (R. 
964). At no time relevant to Evans' claims did the City ever "seek" arbitration. R. 490-
514. 
Paragraph 47: Evans responded, in part, by arguing that the actions of Salt Lake 
City, through its plan administrator and agent, Educators, constituted a waiver of any 
arbitration process between the parties that might otherwise be required. R. 519-541. 
RESPONSE: This Statement of Fact is only partially correct. In opposition to the 
City's summary judgment motion, Evans argued that the arbitration provisions in the 
LTD Plan were unenforceable and failed to comply with various provisions of the Utah 
Administrative Code. Evans also asserted, for the first time in this litigation, that the City 
was barred from "seeking arbitration" due to its "participation in litigation." Evans 
argued that because Educators brought an action against him to recover an overpayment, 
and Evans then sued the City through a third-party complaint, the City waived any right 
to arbitration. Nowhere in his opposing memorandum did Evans argue or assert that he 
complied with, or exhausted, the claims review process as required under the LTD Plan. 
R. 534-541. 
THE CITY'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. Mr. Evans admits that he failed to comply with the LTD Plan's claims review 
process. Evans' Response to the City's Undisputed Facts, \ 9, R. 525-26. 
2. Mr. Evans admits that On May 8, 2003, Educators informed Evans that his 
appeal was received 30 days late, and thus Evans had waived his contractual right to 
appeal to the Board of Directors. Evans' Response to the City's Undisputed Facts, % 10, 
R. 526. 
3. Mr. Evans' request to waive the Plan's 30-day filing requirement was denied 
by Educators by letter dated June 5, 2003. Evans' Response to the City *s Undisputed 
Facts, ^11,R. 526-27. 
4. Mr. Evans admits that the Plan, immediately under the heading "Exhaustion of 
Administrative Remedies," provides the following: "No action at law or in equity may be 
brought against the City, Educators or the Plan Administrator, and no arbitration request 
may be made, until the covered employee has exhausted the Claims Review Process, as 
provided in this Plan." Evans' Response to the City's Undisputed Facts, f^ 14, R. 528-29. 
5. Upon exhaustion of the Claims Review Process outlined in the Plan, the 
employee must submit resolution of the claim to binding arbitration. Under the heading 
"Arbitration" on page 8, the Plan clearly states that "arbitration is mandatory, and by 
acceptance of this Plan, the covered employee does knowingly and intentionally agree 
that binding arbitration is and shall be the exclusive method of resolving any such 
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unresolved claim, controversy, or dispute." Evans'Response to the City's Undisputed 
Facts, H 16, R. 529-30. 
6. Mr. Evans admits that, following the denial of his appeal to Educators' 
Executive Committee in June of 2003, he took no legal action against the City in this 
matter until he filed a Third-Party Complaint against the City on January 3, 2005. Evans' 
Response to the City's Undisputed Facts, f 17, R. 530. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly concluded that the City was entitled to summary 
judgment, dismissing Mr. Evans' claims against the City with prejudice. First, Mr. Evans 
failed to preserve the issue of VA benefit offset against the City on appeal. All of the 
citations to the record provided by Mr. Evans demonstrate that this issue was preserved 
only as to Educators, not the City. 
Second, Mr. Evans does not challenge the trial court's ruling that the City is 
entitled to immunity on all of Evans' non-contractual claims. Therefore, pursuant to the 
UGIA, all claims not based on contractual rights or obligations were properly dismissed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This includes Mr. Evans' claims regarding 
COBRA provisions, alleged breach of Utah statutes, and LTD Plan administration. 
Third, no allegation that the City had any participation in offsetting Mr. Evans' 
VA benefits was at issue on summary judgment below. It is conceded by all parties that 
the offset was carried out by Educators, not the City. Indeed, throughout his appellate 
brief, Mr. Evans makes no factual allegation that the City had anything to do with VA 
benefit offsets. 
Fourth, Mr. Evans alleges that PELTDA precludes the City from offsetting his 
LTD benefits. This is a statutory compliance/interpretation claim, not a contract claim, 
which was properly dismissed under the UGIA. 
With regard to Mr. Evans' arbitration claims, there is no question that he raised his 
arbitration arguments for the first time in opposition to the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Further, Mr. Evans' arbitration arguments fail because he admittedly failed to 
exhaust the claims review process as required by the express terms of the LTD Plan, and 
was therefore precluded by the express terms of the LTD Plan from instituting legal 
action against the City or requesting arbitration. Even if he was entitled to arbitrate any 
claims he had against the City, he clearly failed to do so. 
His argument that the City waived any right to "seek arbitration" because it 
"participated in litigation" is completely unavailing. To begin with, the City does not 
"seek," nor has it ever "sought," arbitration. At all times relevant to this litigation, the 
duty to seek arbitration was on Mr. Evans, not the City. Further, it is undisputed that the 
City did not sue Mr. Evans. Educators sued Mr. Evans, and Mr. Evans then sued the 
City. The fact that the City defended itself against Mr. Evans' Third-Party Complaint has 
no relevance to Mr. Evans' failure to comply with the LTD Plan's terms regarding 




MR. EVANS HAS NO CLAIM ON APPEAL AGAINST THE CITY 
REGARDING THE OFFSET OF HIS VA BENEFITS. 
A. 
MR. EVANS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF VA BENEFIT OFFSET 
FOR APPEAL AGAINST THE CITY. 
In Paragraph 1 of his Statement of the Issues Presented for Review, Mr. Evans 
seeks appellate review as to whether the PELTDA precludes the City from reducing Mr. 
Evans' benefits under the LTD Plan by the amount of his VA disability benefits. AOB at 
3. He cites to certain portions of the Record where he alleges he preserved this issue for 
appeal. Id. However, all of those citations involve litigation in the trial court with 
Educators, not the City. None of the citations set forth by Mr. Evans preserve the issue 
on appeal as to the City. 
Pages 186-188 of the Record are from Mr. Evans' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Educators' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Evans' Cross Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. R. 161-296. Pages 850-855 are from Educators' Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 846-873. Pages 907-911 are 
from Mr. Evans' Memorandum in Opposition to Educators' Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 906-919. Pages 988-990 are from Mr. Evans' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Educators' Motion for Relief from Order and Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Similarly, all of Evans" arguments in his opening brief regarding whether VA 
disability benefits are the same as "armed services disability benefits" were never raised 
before the trial court on the City's summary judgment motion. AOB at 24-27. The same 
applies to his arguments that the injuries for which he was awarded VA benefits were 
different than those for which he was awarded LTD benefits. AOB at 29-30. The City 
has never had the opportunity to address these arguments, raised for the first time against 
the City on appeal. 
Mr. Evans has failed to preserve the issue of VA benefit offset on appeal against 
the City. 
B-
ALL OF MR EVANS' CLAIMS NOT SOUND[NG IN 
CONTRACT, INCLUDING HIS VA BENEFIT CLAIM, WERE 
APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED UNDER THE UGIA. 
The trial court below granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all of Mr. 
Evans' claims that did not involve contractual rights or obligations regarding the City. 
On appeal here, Mr. Evans does not challenge this portion of the trial court's ruling. 
Therefore, all of Evans' claims related to COBRA provisions, compliance with Utah 
statutes, and LTD Plan administration are barred. 
Whether PELTDA precludes the City from reducing Mr. Evans' disability benefits 
by the amount of his VA disability benefits is an issue of statutory 
compliance/interpretation. It does not sound in contract, and therefore it was properly 
dismissed by the trial court. 
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c. 
THE CITY HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN OFFSETTING 
MR. EVANS' VA DISABILITY BENEFITS, NOR WAS THIS ISSUE RAISED 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Even if Mr. Evans' appeal of the VA benefit offset issue against the City survives 
the foregoing arguments, he cannot demonstrate that this issue was brought before the 
trial court on the City's summary judgment motion, or that the trial court even ruled on 
this issue. Further, there are no facts asserted by Mr. Evans that demonstrate that the City 
had any participation in Educators' offset of Mr. Evans' VA disability benefits. Indeed, 
it is conceded by all parties that the offset was carried out by Educators, not the City. 
Throughout his appellate brief, Mr. Evans contends as such repeatedly, making no factual 
assertion at all that the City had anything to do with VA disability offsets. 
Mr. Evans' first issue on appeal must be rejected. 
fl-
AS THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED, THE ARBITRATION 
PROVISIONS IN THE LTD PLAN WERE CONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW 
AND ENFORCEABLE. BECAUSE MR. EVANS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 
THE TERMS OF THE LTD PLAN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
GRANTED TO THE CITY. 
A. 
MR. EVANS RAISED HIS ARBITRATION ARGUMENTS 
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
On Summary Judgment before the trial court, the City also argued that Mr. Evans 
failed to comply with the LTD Plan's requirement that he exhaust the claims review 
process before availing himself of arbitration or litigation. R. 499. Indeed, argued the 
City, even if he had exhausted the claims review process, Mr. Evans had no right to sue 
the City because the LTD Plan clearly required that he arbitrate his dispute with 
Educators. R. 500. At no time did the City move for summary judgment on the ground 
that Mr. Evans failed to request arbitration. 
In opposition, Mr. Evans alleged, for the first time in the litigation, that the Plan's 
arbitration provisions were unenforceable and failed to comply with various provisions of 
the Utah Administrative Code. (R. 534-37). Evans also asserted, for the first time in the 
litigation, that the City was barred from "seeking arbitration" due to its "participation in 
litigation." (R. 537-39). 
These allegations are found nowhere in Mr. Evans' Third-Party Complaint against 
the City. Both of these arguments were raised for the first time against the City in 
opposition to its summary judgment motion. Mr. Evans cannot be permitted to 
essentially amend his Complaint in this manner, presenting an ever-shifting target in 
litigation. Utah courts cannot rely on such allegations raised for the first time in 
opposition to summary judgment. See Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App 165, f 14. "A 
plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a 
memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment because 
such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements." Holmes Dev., LLC v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 38, f 31, 48 P.3d 895 (citations omitted). Mr. Evans had more than 
ample opportunity to amend his Third-Party Complaint if he wished to assert such claims 
against the City. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). He failed to do so here. Therefore, he 
cannot effectively raise such new claims in opposition to summary judgment. 
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B. 
MR. EVANS FAILED TO EXHAUST THE CLAIMS REVIEW PROCESS AS 
REQUIRED BY THE LTD PLAN. 
Nowhere in his memorandum opposing summary judgment did Evans argue or 
assert that he complied with, or exhausted, the claims review process as required under 
the LTD Plan. To the contrary, he admitted he did not. Evans' Response to the City's 
Undisputed Facts, ^ 9, R. 525-26. Because Mr. Evans failed to controvert the very basis 
of the City's second ground for summary judgment, i.e. that Evans failed to comply with 
the terms and conditions of the LTD Plan, the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment to the City. Mr. Evans does not contest this part of the ruling on appeal. 
Therefore, because the LTD Plan clearly precluded further legal action, whether 
arbitration or litigation, where a claimant failed to exhaust the claims review process, 
Evans cannot raise his arbitration claims on appeal. 
c. 
THE CITY HAS NEVER SUED MR. EVANS, 
In opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Evans argued that because Educators 
brought an action against him to recover an overpayment, and Evans then sued the City 
through a third-party complaint, the City waived any right to arbitration. In addition to 
the grounds set forth above, this assertion should be rejected on appeal because it is 
undisputed that the City never sued Mr. Evans. He claims that the City "directed 
Educators to sue Evans to recover" the claimed overpayment, but cites no facts of record 
in support. A OB at 34. This is because there are no facts of any kind supporting this 
conclusory and speculative assertion. 
Mr. Evans further claims that the City "answered Evans' Third Party Complaint 
and did not raise its argument about requiring arbitration until over a year after its agent 
Educators, began litigation against Evans." Id. Again, the City never, at any time, 
argued to the trial court on summary judgment that arbitration was required. As set forth 
above, the City argued for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Evans failed to 
comply with the claims review requirements of the LTD Plan. In failing to do so, he 
could not pursue arbitration or litigation against Educators or the City. It also pointed out 
that even if he did so comply, he could not sue the City, as he did here, because the 
express terms of the LTD Plan made arbitration mandatory, and the exclusive method for 
resolving Evans' dispute with Educators. 
The City does not "seek," nor has it ever "sought," arbitration in this matter. At 
all times relevant to this litigation, the only party with any duty to seek arbitration was 
Mr. Evans, not Educators or the City. Further, the fact that the City defended itself 
against Mr. Evans' Third-Party Complaint has no relevance to Evans' failure to comply 
with the terms and conditions of the LTD Plan regarding exhaustion of the claims review 
process and/or requests for arbitration. Finally, Educators sued for recovery of overpaid 
benefits when it became clear that Mr. Evans had failed to exhaust the claims review 
process, failed to pursue arbitration, and failed to take any other action in this dispute for 
almost one and a half years after his last appeal was denied. Educators' action cannot 
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operate to retroactively "waive" the LTD Plan's requirement that Evans' dispute must 
have been arbitrated, not litigated. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Mr. 
Evans failed to preserve the issue of VA benefit offset against the City on appeal. The 
City had no role in the offset of Mr. Evans' LTD disability benefits by the amount of VA 
disability benefits he was receiving at the same time. Further, the PELTDA provisions 
regarding offset of VA benefits is an issue of statutory compliance/interpretation, not 
contractual rights and obligations. Therefore, this issue was properly dismissed pursuant 
to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Regarding Mr. Evans' arbitration claims, he improperly raised those claims for the 
first time in this litigation in opposition to summary judgment. He cannot be permitted to 
essentially amend his Complaint in this manner, presenting an ever-shifting target in 
litigation. Further, because he failed to exhaust the claims review process, he is 
precluded by the terms and conditions of the LTD Plan from requesting arbitration or 
instituting litigation. Finally, the City does not "seek," nor has it ever "sought," 
arbitration in this matter. The City did not sue Mr. Evans. The fact that Educators sued 
Mr. Evans to recover overpaid benefits does not operate to retroactively "waive" the LTD 
Plan's requirement that Evans' dispute must have been arbitrated, not litigated. 
Based on the foregoing, Third-Party Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake City 
Corporation respectfully request that this Court AFFIRM the trial court's decision to 
grant summary judgment in its favor. 
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